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Abstract
This work explores the development of MemTri. A memory forensics triage tool
that can assess the likelihood of criminal activity in a memory image, based on
evidence data artefacts generated by several applications. Fictitious illegal
suspect activity scenarios were performed on virtual machines to generate 60 test
memory images for input into MemTri. Four categories of applications (i.e.
Internet Browsers, Instant Messengers, FTP Client and Document Processors)
are examined for data artefacts located through the use of regular expressions.
These identified data artefacts are then analysed using a Bayesian Network, to
assess the likelihood that a seized memory image contained evidence of illegal
activity. Currently, MemTri is under development and this paper introduces only
the basic concept as well as the components that the application is built on. A
complete description of MemTri coupled with extensive experimental results is
expected to be published in the first semester of 2017.
Keywords: Digital Forensics; Triage; Cyber Crime; Digital Evidence; Random
Access Memory
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1 Introduction
With the current advances in digital forensics, it is becoming more common for
law enforcement personnel to encounter digital devices as part of seized evidence
to be examined. This list of digital devices include various machines with different
architectures and specifications (e.g. desktops, laptops, mobile phones, tablets etc).
The growing influx of seized digital devices has generated a backlog of court case
evidence to be forensically examined [1]. A proposed solution for alleviating this
evidence backlog is to develop triage execution tools that incorporate data mining
techniques [2]. The main aim of such triage tools is to quickly assess whether a
digital device contains relevant case evidence or not, and how much priority should
be placed on fully analyzing the device.
Even though there are many crime classification triage tools for disk and mobile
forensics, there is a clear lack of any such similar triage tool for memory forensics.
The absence of such memory forensics tools is considered as an obstacle that pre-
vents investigators from thoroughly analyzing digital devices. This is mainly due to
the fact that various research has shown that memory can contain critical evidence
such as internet browsing data, network traffic, malware, passwords, cryptographic
Michalas and Murray Page 2 of 10
keys and decrypted content, some of which may never be stored to disk [3, 4]. A pos-
sible reason for the apparent low research in developing crime classification triage
tools for memory forensics is due to the complexity in analyzing operating system
(OS) memory structures, which is still a fairly adolescent area of research. The
open-source tools Volatility [5] and Rekall [6] have aided in simplifying the analy-
sis of such OS memory structures by incorporating the academic research done by
various authors in reverse engineering these structures. In this paper, we leverage
from the various research incorporated into the Volatility framework [5] and we pro-
pose MemTri – a memory triage application that analyzes OS memory structures.
It was simply decided to utilize the Volatility framework for this project, due to
it being the most widely utilized and tested memory analysis tool in the academic
community. Another factor that may have contributed to the apparent research
in developing crime classification triage tools for memory forensics, is due to the
fact that acquiring memory requires careful planning and skill in order to collect a
‘forensically sound’ [7] memory image, which in-turn has led to the slow adoption
of performing memory image acquisitions by law enforcement departments.
Another challenge in memory forensics is that, if the user terminates the applica-
tion process used to perform an illegal activity then the freed virtual address space
is often quickly overwritten by other activity within the operating system. How-
ever, Garfinkel et al. [8] showed that portions of unallocated memory can remain
unchanged for up to 14 days – even when the system is actively being utilized.
Therefore, since some data artefacts may not be overwritten in unallocated mem-
ory space by the OS, it is still possible to extract such data artefacts for memory
analysis, similar to carving for files in a file system. MemTri is developed with two
modes of operation, namely normal and scan mode, that gives valuable insights for
the best methods to process evidence artefacts in a volatile memory environment.
MemTri offers a way to quantitatively measure the likelihood that a specific crim-
inal offence was committed. The results are based on an extended analysis of test
evidence data artefacts that were found in Random Access Memory (RAM), and
help us to determine the priority that should be placed on fully examining a set of
memory images. Towards this direction, we build MemTri on top of a Bayesian Net-
work and the Volatility Framework. Furthermore, in order to successfully achieve
our goal, we developed a certain set of algorithms through which we can assess the
effectiveness of locating data artefacts in RAM, after the process that generated the
artefact has terminated. This is of paramount importance since a forensics analy-
sis is likely to be held after the termination of the application that used to create
private information of the “corrupted” parties.
1.1 Organization
The rest of this position paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
relevant related work regarding existing triage solutions in the field of digital foren-
sics. In Section 3, we introduce the system model, as well as the preliminaries that
MemTri is built on. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude the paper by providing a set
of future directions.
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2 Related Work
In this section we review the most important works that have been published in the
field of digital forensics and we specifically focus on existing triage solutions.
According to [9], the definition of triage in regards to digital forensics is “a pro-
cess in which digital evidence is ranked in terms of importance or priority”. There
have been proposed various methodologies for developing triage tools for the main
branches of digital forensics, i.e. disk forensics, memory forensics, mobile phone
forensics and network forensics.
Bogen et al. [10] developed Redeye – a disk document triage tool. Redeye, uti-
lizes a corpus-based term weighting scheme (TF-ICF) and semi-supervised machine
learning to triage identification of documents that relate to a specific case. The
corpus-based term weighting scheme mainly assesses the similarity between doc-
uments based on the frequency of a word and its position in relation to other
keywords. Document analysts are then able to identify documents that are most
likely similar/related to certain key documents they have marked as relevant to an
investigation. The system further monitors the tags and comments made by ana-
lysts in order to ‘learn’ which type of documents are of particular importance to an
investigation. Moreover, Redeye successfully aided to significantly reduce the com-
pletion time of a forensic analysis. Even though Redeye focuses on a different field
of forensics than MemTri, it demonstrates the ability of supervised machine learning
techniques (similarly utilized by MemTri’s Bayesian Network) to successfully triage
tasks in an investigation.
Li et al. [11] developed a memory triage tool that uses fuzzy hashing to intuitively
identify malware by detecting common pieces of malicious code found within a pro-
cess. Authors, identified a limitation with the asymmetric distance computation of
existing fuzzy hashing algorithms and assess four key insights, based on precision
and recall, which can improve the fuzzy hashing algorithms’ performance. The im-
provement of such fuzzy hashing algorithms aids investigators to more quickly and
accurately determine whether a machine has been affected by malware before at-
tempting a full investigation. MemTri’s performance is similarly tested using such
performance measures which can reveal key areas of triage-related improvements.
Walls et al. [12] developed DEC0DE, a mobile phone forensics triage tool.
DEC0DE, uses block hash filtering (BHF), Viterbi’s algorithm and Decision Tree
inference. During BHF, similar byte streams between mobile phone models, which
most likely will contain operating system data that is not relevant to the investiga-
tor, are removed. Therefore, the mobile data that remains after BHF completes is
likely to be user’ data such as call logs and address book information. This data is
further processed using Viterbi’s algorithm and Decision Tree inference to improve
the recall and precision of the filtered data. Authors, highlighted that mobile phone
forensics triage can help to gather key information upfront for use in suspect in-
terviews, before the full analysis is performed which can take months to complete
due to backlog of devices to be analyzed. Similarly, MemTri provides the digital
investigator with a quick assessment of key evidence artefacts found in a memory
image which can then be used as persuasive evidence in a suspect interview.
In [13], authors developed a network triage application that uses a client-server
model in order to search multiple client machines for evidence. An automated net-
work triage (ANT) server that hosts various services is used to configure and boot
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PXE enabled clients. When the client machine boots, a batch script is simply ran
to search for keywords, patterns and file hashes on the client machine’s disk. This
network forensics triage tool can essentially help to locate a machine within a net-
work that was most likely involved in the crime being investigated and thus the
identified machine can be seized/prioritised for further investigation. Without such
a triage tools an investigator would have to analyze all the machines in the network
individually which is impractical/time-consuming.
The aforementioned works by the various authors in the different fields of digital
forensics shows that triage tools have proven to be a valuable solution to the ‘data
volume challenge’ [2]. Generally, these triage solutions offer a quick way of narrowing
down the devices to those that contain critical data before a full digital forensics
analysis is performed. Similarly, our work contributes to the area of digital forensics
triage tools with an emphasis on memory forensics.
3 System model and Preliminaries
In this section we describe the system model, as well as some terminology and basic
concepts that will be used in the rest of the paper.
Suspect Machine (SM): For the needs of our work, four types of software
applications, namely Internet Browser, Instant Messenger, Document Processor and
FTP Client, are examined. Therefore, we created several Windows 7 virtual machine
instances where we pre-installed the various software applications listed in Table 1.
These applications are also referred to as the ‘target applications’. Each virtual
machine is then shutdown and a copy of the virtual machine files is made. These
copied files are referred to as the base virtual machine image which is used as the
starting point for performing the suspect activity analysis.
Type Application(s)
Internet Browser Tor, Chrome
Instant Messenger Wickr, Skype
Document Processor Windows Notepad, Libre Writer
FTP Client Filezilla
Table 1 List of applications installed by type
Evidence Search Engine (ESE): The Evidence Search Engine component is
responsible for extracting evidence artefacts from the ‘suspect’ memory image and
translating them into features that can be used by a bayesian network analyser. This
approach was mainly inspired by [4, 14, 15] which showed that intuitive evidence
artefacts can be retrieved by simply searching for ASCII/Unicode data patterns
generated by specific applications. This regular expressions approach is also flexible
in that it can locate evidence artefacts in a memory image regardless of the OS
environment in which the artefacts were generated. Additionally, regular expres-
sions can be executed fairly quickly to locate evidence within large datasets. This
intuitiveness, flexibility and speed offered by regular expression evidence searching
methods, are essential traits for the development of an effective digital forensics
triage tool.
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Bayesian Network Analyser (BNA): MemTri uses a Bayesian Network to
analyze the evidence found by the ESE. An output rating is then produced that
can be used to rank a set of suspect memory images, based on the likelihood level
of criminal activity. We decided to build the Bayesian Network based on the model
proposed in [16], since it is simple to interpret and has proven successful in correctly
analyzing real-life criminal investigations. Comparative studies have also analyzed
that Bayesian approaches to developing digital forensics triage tools, on average
have the best accuracy performance [17] (88.5%) compared to other supervised ma-
chine learning (SML) techniques such as Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees
and K-Nearest Neighbour. This combination of accuracy and ease of interpretation
supported by Bayesian Network approaches, are favourable traits when seeking to
triage a criminal investigation. Additionally, Bayesian Networks handles missing ev-
idence most eloquently, since it is naturally incorporated into its design. Handling
missing evidence is of paramount importance for successful forensics investigations
since evidence can often be missing due to it being destroyed or not yet discovered.
Bayesian Network: In digital forensics triage, law enforcement personnel often
has to make quick decisions based on evidence found on a crime scene. Thus, a
soundly built Bayesian Network can efficiently aid in determining the best course
of action to be taken based on the evidence found. The Bayesian Network model
is an acyclic graph that encodes the conditional independence relationship of the
graph nodes. Figure 1 illustrates a diagram of the Bayesian Network we used for the
needs of our work. This Bayesian Network has been set up by using the Netica [18]
software.
Figure 1 Bayesian Network Example
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H1
H Yes No Uncertain
Yes 60 35 5
No 35 60 5
Uncertain 5 5 90
Table 2 Likelihood Joint Probability for P (H1 | H)
E1
H1 Yes No Uncertain
Yes 85 15 0
No 15 85 0
Uncertain 0 0 100
Table 3 Likelihood Joint Probability for P (E1 | H1)
E2
H1 Yes No Uncertain
Yes 75 25 0
No 25 75 0
Uncertain 0 0 100
Table 4 Likelihood Joint Probability for P (E2 | H1)
This is the general structure of the Bayesian Network that is used throughout
the development of MemTri. The top-most nodes prefixed with H are referred to as
hypothesis nodes while the lowest level nodes prefixed with E are referred to as the
evidence nodes. To make this example more intuitive the nodes have been assigned
specific meanings as follows:
• H: The suspect employee’s computer was used to send confidential company
files to a third party using FTP.
• H1: An FTP connection was established between employee machine and a
third party.
• E1: Network Logs show a TCP connection on port 21 between employee ma-
chine and a third party.
• E2: FTP “Transfer OK” response packet found between employee machine
and a third party in router cache.
The probability values shown in Figure 1 is the Prior Probability values of the
Bayesian Network. The following joint probability tables 2, 3, 4 represent the like-
lihood probability values that are associated with the given Bayesian Network.
These probability values are usually set based on the data gathered from experts
in the field of the investigation. From the aforementioned tables we see that a node
has three states ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Uncertain’. An important point to note is that the
probabilities in the Bayesian Network must add up to 100%.
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Now, let us assume that an investigator wants to determine the probability that
the suspect employee sent confidential files to a third party given that he has ob-
served that there was a FTP ‘Transfer OK’ packet found. In other words, the inves-
tigator wants to determine P (H = Y | E2 = Y ). This hypothesis can be examined
by performing Bayesian Inference. Statistically inferring a conclusion for this hy-
pothesis can be useful in aiding the investigator to confidently decide whether the
investigation is worth a certain dedication of resources.
Now, the nodes encountered from H to E2 are H, H1 and E2. There are also no
additional parent nodes that has to be considered. Therefore, the joint probability
equation for the portion of the Bayesian Network needed for inference is:
P(H ∩H1 ∩ E2) = P (H) P (H1 | H) P (E2 | H1)
Applying the enumeration method for calculating Bayesian Inference, the equation
that is needed to evaluate the investigator’s request is:
P (H = Y | E2 = Y ) =
∑
H1 P (H ∩H1 ∩ E2)
P (E2)
=




Therefore, the probability that the employee sent the files to a third party given
the FTP packet evidence found based on Bayesian Inference is 0.538. This can be
seen visually in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Bayesian Network with Observed Evidence Example
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4 Conclusion and Future Work
Actions carried out by a suspect on a computer generates various forms of data
artefacts in volatile main memory. In this paper, we presented MemTri. A Memory
Forensics triage tool that identifies data artefacts in memory for certain Internet
Browsers, Instant Messengers, Document Processors and FTP Client applications,
using regular expressions. This work demonstrated that even after a targeted ap-
plication process was terminated, some data artefacts could still be extracted from
unallocated regions of memory.
The Bayesian Network developed in this work, encodes expert knowledge gathered
from a designed digital forensics expert questionnaire, and successfully uses it to
provide a probabilistic output rating that a memory image contains evidence of
illegal firearms trading activity. Currently, MemTri is under development so we did
not present any experimental results. However, in the final paper we plan to provide
extensive experimental results regarding the overall performance and accuracy of
MemTri.
We hope that this project would inspire further research into developing digital
forensics triage tools, specifically geared at assessing criminal activity found in main
memory. Some significant improvements have been identified to prepare MemTri for
use in actual criminal investigations. Finally, this work only utilized a limited set of
case-specific words to locate evidence. The next stage is to implement a Knowledge-
based Natural Language Processing (NLP) system into MemTri’s Evidence Search
Engine which utilizes a domain-specific dictionary [19] (for example, a dictionary
of illegal firearms related words). This upgrade will allow MemTri to effectively
locate evidence in the context of any specified criminal investigation, thus making
it practical for use in a real-life environment.
Finally, an interesting direction would be to incorporate MemTri into cloud-based
services and also use it to investigate data collected through participatory sensing
applications [20]. More precisely, our vision is to install MemTri on a Trusted Cloud
Service provider [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and give the option to users to run regular exper-
iments in order to identify possible malicious behaviours. To do so, MemTri will have
to develop an API that will be available via a Platform-as-a-Service infrastructure
similar to the one described in [26] and [27]. By doing this, MemTri will be able to of-
fer a reliable solution to many applications that today suffer from poor investigation
of malicious behaviours. For example, the health sector that is gradually moving to
the cloud will gain lot of benefits since personal health records are considered as
sacrosanct [28, 29, 30] and needs to be properly protected. In addition to that, by
moving MemTri with cloud-based services, we will be able to further enhance the
accuracy of our tool by incorporating specific techniques [31, 32] where users’ will
be able to rate the veracity of the tool in an anonymous and privacy-preserving
way [33, 34].
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